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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In her Appellant's Brief, Bridgett Lee Deluca argued that the district court abused 
its discretion when it failed to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2522 and alternatively pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, prior to her probation violation 
disposition hearing. Ms. Deluca also argued that the district court abused its discretion 
when it revoked her probation and denied her I.C. R. 35 motion requesting leniency. In 
its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that I.C. § 19-2522 is not applicable prior to a 
probation violation disposition hearing because the statute contains the phrase "prior to 
sentencing." 
Ms. Deluca is filing a Reply Brief to argue that the same policy rationale behind 
I.C. 19-2522 is equally applicable to both sentencing hearings and a probation violation 
disposition hearings, because under both circumstances the district court is tasked with 
determining the length of a defendant's sentence. Additionally, Ms. Deluca is filing this 
brief to clarify that her probation officer's recommendation that Ms. Deluca obtain an 
updated mental health evaluation occurred after sentencing and before the probation 
violation disposition hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Deluca's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 when it failed 
to order a mental health evaluation of Ms. Deluca prior to her probation violation 
disposition hearing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 when it failed 
to order a mental health evaluation of Ms. Deluca prior to her probation violation 
disposition hearing? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Deluca's 
probation? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Deluca's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of new information 
indicating that there is a nexus between Ms. Deluca's mental health issues and 
her substance addiction?1 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2522 When It Failed To 
Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Ms. Deluca Prior To Her Probation Violation 
Disposition Hearing 
A. Introduction 
In her Appellant's brief, Ms. Deluca acknowledged that the plain language of 
I.C. § 19-2522 is limited to instances where a defendant's mental health will be a 
significant factor at sentencing. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has applied 
I.C. § 19-2522 in instances where a defendant requests a mental health evaluation prior 
to a district court's disposition of an I.C. R. 35 motion, because the same set of factors 
are applicable at sentencing and at an I.C.R. 35 disposition. In its Respondent's Brief, 
the State argues, without providing a meaningful distinction between a sentencing 
hearing and a probation violation disposition hearing, that I.C. § 19-2522 only applies at 
sentencing hearings. 
Additionally, the State argues that Ms. Deluca's reliance on a statement, from her 
original Presentence investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), does not clearly relate to 
trial counsel's request for an updated mental health evaluation which occurred 
approximately one year after sentencing. Ms. Deluca is filing this brief to clarify that the 
probation officer's recommendation for an updated mental health evaluation was not 
derived from the original PSI, and was made after sentencing and before the probation 
violation disposition hearing. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2522 When It 
Failed To Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Ms. Deluca Prior To Her 
Probation Violation Disposition Hearing 
Section 19-2522 of the Idaho Code requires a court to order a mental health 
evaluation, performed by either a psychiatrist or a psychologist, "[i]f there is reason to 
believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at 
sentencing." State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820 (Ct. App. 2008), held that the language 
of I.C. § 19-2522 is equally applicable prior to the disposition of an I.C.R. 35 motion 
because the "factors that bear upon the need for such an evaluation before sentencing 
are also relevant to" an I.C.R. 35 motion. 
In reliance on the foregoing authority, Ms. Deluca argued in her Appellant's Brief, 
that I.C. § 19-2522 is applicable prior to a probation violation disposition because the 
court has inherent power pursuant to I.C.R. 35 to sua sponte reduce the length of a 
probationers' sentence in the event probation is revoked. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
Additionally, a defendant has the ability to file an I.C.R. 35 motion with fourteen days 
from an order revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
In response the State argued as follows: 
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 applies to sentencing 
hearings, it is not properly asserted in [Ms. Deluca's] case where her 
request for an updated mental health evaluation prior to probation violation 
disposition was denied. This is not inconsistent with Izaguirre. In that 
case, Izaguirre did not request a psychological evaluation prior to 
sentencing, instead waiting until requesting a reduction of his sentence 
pursuant to a Rule 35 motion to request a neuro-psychological evaluation. 
The court found the factors relevant to such an evaluation prior to 
sentencing were also relevant in the context of a Rule 35 motion and 
evaluated the request under an abuse of discretion standard. Here no 
request to update the vast amount of information provided to the court 
regarding [Ms. Deluca's] mental health was made prior to sentencing. No 
request for an update to her mental health evaluation was made by 
[Ms. Deluca] until she served a period of retained jurisdiction, was placed 
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on probation, and ultimately admitted to being in violation of her probation. 
As such, the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 is inapplicable to 
[Ms. Deluca's] situation. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8 (citations omltted)). 
The State's position is entirely inconsistent with Izaguirre and it provided no legal 
or logical support for is distinction between a request for an LC. § 19-2522 evaluation 
made prior to a probation violation disposition hearing and one made prior to an 
I.C.R. 35 disposition. The State argues that I.C. § 19-2522 only applies prior to 
sentencing and, therefore, does not apply prior to a probation violation disposition 
hearing. The State's position is inconsistent with Izaguirre because an I.C.R. 35 motion 
is a post-judgment motion and the disposition of an I.C.R. 35 motion can only occur 
after sentencing. Since Izaguirre recognized that the protections of I.C. § 19-2522 apply 
in I.C.R. 35 proceedings, which occur post-judgment, the "significant factor at 
sentencing" language contained in I.C. § 19-2522 was recognized to apply in post-
judgment contexts, where sentencing factors are at issue. 
The State's purported distinction between the facts of Izaguirre and the facts of 
this case is meaningless. The State argued that this case was different from Izaguirre 
because "[n]o request for an update to her mental health evaluation was made by 
[Ms. Deluca] until she served a period of retained jurisdiction, was placed on probation, 
and ultimately admitted to being in violation of her probation." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) 
The State accurately points out that in Izaguirre there was no request for a mental 
health evaluation prior to sentencing and that no such request was made by Ms. Deluca 
prior to sentencing in this matter. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) With that in mind, the 
only distinction between the two cases is that Izaguirre requested a mental health 
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evaluation prior to an I.C.R. 35 motion and Ms. Deluca requested her mental health 
evaluation after her period of retained jurisdiction and before her probation violation 
disposition hearing. While the State does not articulate why this diction is relevant, at 
best it could be argued that the delay between sentencing in this case was longer than 
the delay in Izaguirre. However, the longer delay in this matter would increase the 
district court's need for an updated mental health evaluation because Ms. Deluca's 
mental health is morel likely to have changed over a longer period of time, which 
increases the odds that the prior mental health information is outdated. 
Further, the State's asserted distinction between an I.C.R. 35 hearing and a 
probation violation disposition hearing is irrelevant because Izaguirre held that I.C. § 19-
2522 is applicable prior to an I.C.R. 35 disposition because the sentencing factors are at 
issue. Here, the State made no argument which distinguished the factors utilized at 
sentencing and the factors at probation violation disposition. As stated above, the State 
might have been arguing that the delay between sentencing and the request for a 
mental health evaluation in this matter was longer than the delay in Izaguirre, and for 
that reason it should not apply in this case. That position is flawed because Izaguirre 
did not address any temporal considerations, and the focus was based on the factors 
the court had to consider in its disposition of an I.C.R. 35 motion. 
A district court must use the same factors when it sentences a defendant and 
when it determines whether it will reduce a defendant's sentence after revoking 
probation. After a district court revokes probation it has the ability to revisit the length 
of the sentence and reduce it pursuant to I.C.R. 35. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 
944 (Ct. App. 2003). The policy behind this practice follows: 
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It is a common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe 
underlying sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in 
the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with probation terms if the 
defendant is placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence also 
preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be denied 
or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence should be 
reduced. A long underlying sentence thus provides the judge a hedge 
against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance. 
State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). Since the district court reviews its 
original sentencing determination when it revokes probation pursuant to I.C.R. 35, the 
district court uses the same factors in that determination. Jensen, 138 Idaho at 944; 
See also State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The criteria for examining 
rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining 
whether the original sentence was reasonable." (citing State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 445, 
450 (Ct. App. 1984)). Further, since the district court might have hedged with an 
excessive sentence to get a defendant to conform to the terms of probation, the 
sentence which is handed down after probation is revoked is more important than the 
sentence which was originally imposed, due to its finality. Therefore, the district court 
needs the most recent and accurate information it can get prior to a probation violation 
disposition hearing, because that is the hearing were the district court is determining the 
actual length of the defendant's sentence. 
In sum, the State provided no legal or logical reasoning in its attempt to 
distinguish between a request for a mental health evaluation prior to an I.C. R. 35 
hearing and the same request prior to a probation violation disposition hearing. 
Additionally, the State provided no reasoning in its attempt to distinguish between the 
facts of this case and Izaguirre. Even if there was a longer delay between sentencing 
and Ms. Deluca's request for an updated mental health evaluation than there was in 
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Izaguirre, that delay only increases the district court's need to get updated information 
pertaining the Ms. Deluca's mental health status. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2524 When It Failed To 
Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Ms. Deluca Prior To Her Probation Violation 
Disposition Hearing 
A. Introduction 
In support of her contention that the district court should have ordered a mental 
health update prior to her probation violation disposition hearing, Ms. Deluca relied on a 
statement made by her probation officer that she had ongoing mental health issues and 
would benefit from an updated mental health evaluation. In is Respondent's Brief, the 
State mischaracterized the probation officer's statement when it asserted that it 
appeared in the 2009 PSI. The statement which Ms. Deluca relied appeared in the 
Report of Probation Violation dated September 14, 2010. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2524 When 
It Failed To Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Ms. Deluca Prior To Her 
Probation Violation Disposition Hearing 
In the Appellant's Brief, Ms. Deluca argued that she needed an update mental 
health evaluation, partially based on her probation officer's statement which follows: 
PHYSCIAL AND MENTAL HEALTH 
The defendant appears to have ongoing mental health issues. She was 
receiving treatment and medication, however, her ongoing use of 
methamphetamine no doubt negated any positive effects treatment, 
counseling and medication would have had. 
I believe the defendant would benefit from an updated mental health 
evaluation. 
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(PSI, p.189.)2 This statement appears in the September 14, 2010, Report of Probation 
violation, which was attached to the July 07, 2009, PSI. The State made the following 
comments about this statement: 
[Ms. Deluca] asserts that her probation officer's desire for an updated 
mental health evaluation stems from a statement in her original PSI by the 
presentence investigator that [Ms. Deluca] would benefit from an updated 
evaluation. (Appellant's [B]rief, p.7.) It is unclear how this relates to a 
request for counsel just over a year later for an updated evaluation to 
assist in a probation violation disposition. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9, n.2.) Ms. Deluca was not relying on a statement contained in 
the 2009 PSI when she asserted that the probation officer said she would benefit from 
an updated mental health evaluation. Ms. Deluca was relying on the September 14, 
2010, report of probation violation. This statement is relevant, because approximately 
three months later, on December 17th, 2010, the district court revoked Ms. Deluca's 
probation without ordering an updated mental health evaluation. (R., pp.160-162.) 
In sum, Ms. Deluca's probation officer filed a Report of Probation Violation in 
September of 2010, approximately three months before her probation was revoked. In 
that report, the probation officer stated that Ms. Deluca has ongoing mental health 
issues and she would benefit an updated mental health evaluation. The State 
erroneously asserted that this statement was irrelevant because it appeared in her 2009 
PSI. 
2 The PSI contains multiple attachments. For ease of reference, the PSI and 




Ms. Deluca respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence, and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation of 
Ms. Deluca's mental health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 and 
I.C.R. 32. Alternatively, Ms. Deluca respectfully requests that this Court reinstate her 
probation and remand this case to the district court to order terms of probation it deems 
appropriate. Alternatively, Ms. Deluca respectfully requests that this Court reduce the 
length of her sentence as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2011. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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